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Abstract 
Of all the possible ways of computing abductive xplanations, the ATMS procedure is one of 
the most popular. While this procedure is known to run in exponential time in the worst case, the 
proof actually depends on the existence of queries with an exponential number of answers. But 
how much of the difficulty stems from having to return these large sets of explanations? Here we 
explore abduction tasks similar to that of the AIMS, but which return relatively small answers. 
The main result is that although it is possible to generate some nontrivial explanations quickly, 
deciding if there is an explanation containing a given hypothesis is NP-complete, as is the task 
of generating even one explanation expressed in terms of a given set of assumption letters. Thus, 
the method of simply listing all explanations, as employed by the ATMS, probably cannot be 
improved upon. An interesting result of our analysis is the discovery of a subtask, we call the 
Support Set Selection Task, that is not only at the core of generating explanations, but is also 
at the core of generating extensions in Reiter’s default logic. Moreover, it is this subtask that 
accounts for the computational difficulty of both forms of reasoning. This establishes for the first 
time a strong connection between computing abductive xplanations and computing extensions in 
default logic. 
1. Introduction 
Of all the possible ways of computing abductive explanations, the procedure em- 
ployed by an assumption-based truth maintenance system (Al&IS) is one of the most 
* Corresponding author. E-mail: selman@research.att.com. 
’ Fellow of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. Supported in part by a grant from the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. E-mail: hector@cs.toronto.edu. 
0004.3702/96/$15.00 @ 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDI 0004-3702( 94) 00069-7 
260 B. Selmun, H.J. Levesque/Artificial Intelligence 82 (1996) 259-272 
popular [ 3,291. It is therefore somewhat surprising that so little effort has gone into 
understanding in precise terms the nature of the computational task performed by an 
ATMS, that is, the what for which an ATMS is a how. 
What do we know in general about this task? It has been known since at least 1985 
that in the worst case, any procedure that computes what the ATMS computes will 
need time that is exponential in the length of its input [ 241. This is because there are 
problems for which the desired set of answers (where intuitively, each answer is a set of 
assumptions that would aplain a given condition) is exponentially large. Perhaps this 
simple fact has discouraged further theoretical analysis into the worst-case difficulty of 
computing explanations. 
But it doesn’t tell the whole story. Is the fact that an ATMS can take exponential 
time only due to cases where an exponential number of answers need to be returned? 
What if instead of generating all the answers, we only required a procedure to reply 
to simple yes/no questions about them, such as whether or not there is an explanation 
containing a given assumption? Furthermore, in many (if not most) applications, we 
expect to be dealing with a very small number of explanations. For example, in circuit 
diagnosis, explanations involve sets of possibly faulty components [ 25,301, and one 
would not expect k components to break down independently, for large k. Is it still 
the case that generating a small number of explanations is hard? In other words, if 
an ATMS still runs in exponential time for problems like this (as it apparently does 
[ 261)) should we be looking for a different procedure, or is this the best that can be 
expected? 
In this paper, we attempt to answer these questions. In particular, we show that certain 
natural variations of the ATMS task that do not require enumerating all the answers are 
nonetheless NP-hard. In our view, this provides concrete evidence that the ATMS is 
doing as well as can be expected. 
But something more fundamental came out of the analysis. We were surprised to 
discover a strong connection between computing explanations on the one hand, and 
computing extensions in Reiter’s default logic [28], on the other. It turns out that both 
tasks share a common computational core. Moreover, it is this common subtask that 
leads to the computational difficulty of both abductive and default reasoning. Apart 
from the fact that both forms of reasoning use the word “assumption”, this is the first 
result that we know of to show a clear relationship between the computational properties 
of these two apparently very different forms of reasoning. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review Reiter 
and de Kleer’s analysis of the ATMS. Next, we show that while it is always easy to 
find at least one nontrivial explanation, determining if there is one containing a given 
assumption, or finding one that is expressed only in terms of a given assumption set is 
NP-hard. In Section 4, we consider a weaker version of the ATMS task (which we call 
the Support Selection Task), where explanations are not required to be minimal, and 
show that it too is NP-hard. In Section 5, we briefly review the definitions from Reiter’s 
default logic, and show that the problem of computing an extension is a variant of the 
Support Selection Task where we care about maximality instead of minimality. It turns 
out that making a support set minimal or maximal is easy; it is finding one in the first 
place that is hard. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
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2. Abduction 
In this section, we formally define what constitutes an explanation as computed by the 
ATh4S [ 291. We will assume a standard propositional language ,C with propositional 
letters from the set P. We will use p, q, r, s, and t (possibly with subscripts) to 
denote propositional letters. A clause is a disjunction of literals (a literal is either a 
propositional letter, called a positive literal, or its negation, called a negative literal). We 
will represent a clause by the set of literals contained in the clause. A clause is called 
a unit clause if it only contains a single literal. A clause is Horn iff it contains at most 
one positive literal. A set of Horn clauses will be called a Horn theory. 
Definition 1 (Explanation). Given a set of clauses 2, called the background theory, 
and a letter q, an explanation for q is a minimal set of unit clauses LY such that 
(1) ZUa kq, and 
(2) 2 U a is consistent. 
For a discussion on the desirability of the above properties, see [ 22].* Instead of 
expressing explanations as sets of unit clauses, we will often give the logical equivalent 
form consisting of the conjunction of the literals occurring in the clauses, e.g., we write 
p A q A r instead of {{p}, {q}, {r}}. 
Example. Let 2 be the set {{p}, {q}, {p,T,T, t}}. The conjunctions r A s and t are 
explanations for t. We call t the trivial explanation for t; our interest lies of course in 
the other, nontrivial explanations. 
The notion of explanation defined above is somewhat more general than the one 
employed in the ATMS. The ATMS only computes a certain subset of these explana- 
tions, namely those whose unit clauses are drawn from a distinguished subset of the 
propositional letters, called assumptions. Assumptions stand for the hypotheses that we 
are willing to consider in the explanations, such as the possible failure of a component 
in circuit diagnosis. (See [23], for a novel application of abductive explanations in 
testing.) 
Definition 2 (Assumption-based explanation). Given a set of clauses 2, a set of as- 
sumptions A C P, and a letter q, called the query, cr is an assumption-based explanation 
iff 
( 1) (Y is an explanation of q given 2, and 
(2) a only contains letters from A. 
Note that when the assumption set includes all symbols in the language, every expla- 
nation is also an assumption-based one. Also, in the ATh4S the background theory 2 is 
Horn. 
* For a quite different definition of explanation, see [ 1,271. 
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Fig. I. Theory with exponentially many explanations. The theory contains the clauses (a A b) > q, (cud) > a, 
( J‘ A g) 3 b, etc. Consider explanations for q. We get q. a A b, c A d A b, a A f A g, c A d A f A g, etc. The total 
number of explanations is given by the recurrence relation f(k) = f( k - 1) + 1, where k is the number of 
levels. So, f(k) > 22k-2. Since k = [log(n)] , where n is the total number of nodes, it follows that the total 
number of explanations grows exponentially in n. Example from Reiter (personal communication, 1989). 
3. Computing explanations 
We will now consider the computational cost of generating explanations. As is well- 
known, there may be exponentially many explanations for a given letter. McAllester 
[ 241 and de Kleer [ 41 showed this by using an example based on an encoding of the 
parity function.3 Another, perhaps somewhat more natural, example is given in Fig. 1. 
So, clearly, listing all explanations may require exponential time. 4 However, this leaves 
open the question of what the complexity of finding some explanation is. In particular, 
what is the complexity of finding a nontrivial one? 
In case _Z contains arbitrary clauses, finding any explanation is easily shown to be 
NP-hard. 5 However, the following theorem shows that when 2 is a Horn theory, a 
nontrivial explanation (if one exists) can be computed efficiently. 
s Rutenburg [ 3 11 notes that encoding parity requires an exponential size theory [ 151, which would imply 
that the number of explanations is only polynomial in the size of the background theory. However, McAllester 
and de Kleer use auxiliary letters to obtain a theory of polynomial size (in the number of propositional 
letters). 
4 In fact, there may be exponentially many assumption-based explanations, and therefore the worst-case 
complexity of the ATMS, which lists all of them, is clearly exponential. 
5 Since explanations only exist when Z is consistent, an explanation procedure can be used to test the 
satisfiability of a set of clauses. 
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Theorem 3. Given a set of Horn clauses 2 and a letter q, a nontrivial explanation for 
q can be computed in time 0( kn), where k is the number of propositional letters and 
n is the number of occurrences of literals in 2. 
Proof. Here we give only an outline of the algorithm. Consider a clause in 2 of the 
following form: {qi, . . . , 2fk, q} with k 2 1 (if no such clause exists, return “no nontrivial 
explanation”). Now, clearly q1 A. . . A qk with 2 implies q. Subsequently, try removing a 
letter from this conjunction while ensuring that the remaining conjunction together with 
2 still implies q (testing can be done in linear time using the Dowling and Gallier [ 91 
procedure, since W is Horn). Repeat this process until no more letters can be removed. 
If the remaining conjunction is non-empty and combined with 2 is consistent, return 
that one; otherwise consider another clause containing q and repeat the above procedure. 
When all clauses containing q have been explored and no explanation is found, return 
“no nontrivial explanation”. (T o see that the latter is correct consider the set of clauses 
W’ consisting of a nontrivial explanation combined with the original theory. W’ must be 
consistent and combined with 4 should be inconsistent. Now, to create the inconsistency 
with 4 at least one of the clauses in W’ containing q should be “activated”. The negative 
literals in this clauses will form a superset of some nontrivial explanation and would 
have been found by the algorithm.) A direct implementation of this approach would 
give us O(n*) time complexity; a slightly more sophisticated implementation runs in 
time 0( kn). II 
It is clear that the above algorithm only generates certain, very particular 
explanations-which ones depend on the way the background knowledge 2 is expressed. 
But if there are some nontrivial explanations that are easy to find, could it be that in 
some sense they are all easy to find, even if there are too many to list?6 One way to 
look at this question is to consider a procedure that generates only a single explanation, 
but must return different ones for different arguments. For example, if we can ask for 
an explanation containing the letters in St but not containing those in S2, clearly we can 
generate arbitrary explanations. 7 Unfortunately, the following theorem show that there 
can be no efficient procedure for this form of “goal-directed” abduction, even if the set 
ST contains only a single literal and S2 is empty. 
Theorem 4. Given a set of Horn clauses 2 and letters p and q, the problem of 
generating an explanation for q that contains p is NP-complete. 
Proof. First we show that the problem is in NI? We therefore show that a solution can 
be verified in polynomial time. Consider as a solution candidate the set of unit clauses CL 
First check that cr contains p. Then verify that aU 2 is consistent and implies q, because 
W is Horn this can be done in polynomial time. Finally, one can verify the minimality 
of LX, by trying to remove each of its unit clauses (one at a time) and checking whether 
h Note that, for example, one can efficiently list all models (satisfying truth assignments) of a Horn theory. 
See also Dechter and Itai [ 21. 
’ The set SI could be used, for example, to identify components that have a high failure rate when doing 
circuit diagnosis. For a related approach, see [ 71. 
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clauses: 
(bAbd) 3 d 
(SAsb) 3 b 
Fig. 2. Example illustrating the construction used in our NP-completeness result for abduction. The pair (b, e) 
is a forbidden pair. 
the remaining set together with S still implies 9. If no such unit clause exists then a is 
minimal, and thus a valid explanation containing p. 
Next, we show that the problem is as hard as any problem in NP. The proof is based 
on a reduction from the NP-complete decision problem “path with forbidden pairs” 
(or PWFF’) defined in [ 16,171. An instance of PWFP consists of a directed graph 
G=(YE),specifiedverticess,t~V,andacollectionC={(al,bl),...,(a,,b,)}of 
pairs of vertices from V. The question is: Does there exist a path from s to t in G that 
contains at most one vertex from each pair in C? This problem remains NP-complete 
even if we consider only acyclic graphs. 
Given an instance of this restricted version of PWFP, we construct a background 
theory 2. Identifying the vertices of the graph with propositional letters, 2 contains the 
-- 
following clauses: ( 1) for each directed edge (x, y), the clause {+,x, y} where xX is 
a new propositional letter, and (2) for each forbidden pair (ai, bi), the clause {Zi, bi}. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the reduction. Now, consider an explanation for t that contain s. It is 
relatively straightforward to show that if such an explanation exists, it will consist of 
a set of unit clauses of the form {.x?} that uniquely identify a path from s to t in the 
original graph. Moreover, because of the clauses in group (2)) such a path goes through 
at most one vertex of each forbidden pair. Thus, any procedure that can generate an 
explanation for t containing s can also be used to solve PWFP, and so this explanation 
problem is as hard as any problem in NP 0 
Intuitively speaking, Theorem 4 shows that certain explanations will be hard to find, 
even if our background theory 2 is Horn. And, as can be seen from the reduction, this 
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result also holds when .Z consists of an acyclic Horn theory. 8 
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Let us now consider the influence of an assumption set as used in the ATMS. Recall 
that the assumption set A is a distinguished subset of the propositional letters and that 
given a query q, the ATMS will generate only explanations that contain letters from 
among those in A. Note that the assumption set again allows one to select a certain 
subset of all possible explanations. This way of selecting certain explanations is related, 
but not identical, to the notion of goal-directed abduction. The following theorem shows 
that the use of such an assumption set again dramatically increases the complexity of 
finding a nontrivial explanation (compare with Theorem 3) : 
Theorem 5. Given a set of Horn clauses 2, a set of assumptions A, and a query letter 
q, finding an assumption-based explanation for q is NP-complete. 
Proof. It is again easy to see that the problem is in NP because consistency checking 
and inference for Horn theories can be done in polynomial time. For the completeness 
part, we modify the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 4: Add the clause {s} to the 
background theory, and let the assumption set contain all letters of the form xY. Now, 
an assumption-based explanation will consist of a subset of the letters in the assumption 
set, and as above, this set will uniquely identify a path from s to t not containing any 
forbidden pair. Again, the problem remains NP-complete even for acyclic theories. Cl 
This theorem shows that apart from the fact that the ATh4S may have to list an 
exponential number of explanations, merely finding one of them may require exponential 
time. 
Let us now consider the experimental observation, reported by Provan [ 261, that the 
ATMS can exhibit exponential behaviour even if the background theory is such that there 
are only a few assumption-based explanations for the query letter. Provan argues that 
such restricted theories have practical significance, for example, in scene interpretation 
since, although there may many local ambiguities in scene interpretation tasks, there are 
generally only a few globally consistent interpretations for any given scene. 
The following result shows that in fact the intractability observed by Provan is inherent 
in the task, and not simply caused by the particular procedure employed in the ATMS: 
Theorem 6. Given a set of assumptions A, a query q, and a set of Horn clauses 2 
such that 9 has at most one assumption-based explanation, jinding this explanation is 
NP-hard under randomized reductions. 
Proof. We use a result by Valiant and Vazirani [36], who show that determining 
propositional satisfiability remains hard (unless NP = RP, considered unlikely) even 
if one guarantees that the given instances of SAT has at most one satisfying truth 
assignment. Since the reduction from SAT to PWFP and the reduction from PWFP 
’ Given a Horn theory 2, let G be a directed graph containing a vertex for each letter in 2 and an edge 
from any vertex corresponding to a letter on the left-hand side of a Horn rule to the vertex corresponding to 
the letter on the right hand-side of that rule. A Horn theory is acyclic if and only if the associated graph G 
is acyclic. 
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to assumption-based explanations are parsimonious (i.e., the number of solutions is 
preserved), it follows that even if we guarantee that there is at most one assumption- 
based explanation for the query letter, finding it still remains hard. So the problem of 
generating assumption-based explanations even for such special restricted background 
theories remains intractable. 0 
One remaining question is whether the problem is still hard if we are guaranteed that 
there are only a few explanations overall (including the non-assumption-based ones) 
for the query. Note that we can always generate at least one nontrivial explanation (see 
Theorem 3); we conjecture however that generating O(n) of them is again NP-hard 
(possibly under randomized reductions), where n is the number of propositional letters 
in the language. 9 
Finally, given these negative results about the difficulty of dealing with Horn the- 
ories, even acyclic ones, one might wonder whether one can trade expressiveness for 
tractability in abductive reasoning. Fortunately, our reduction in Fig. 2 suggests one fur- 
ther restriction. Note that the clauses containing two negative literals are central to the 
reduction. Such clauses represent incompatibilities between possible hypotheses. Now, 
when we disallow such clauses, and restrict ourselves to background theories contain- 
ing only positive Horn clauses, lo an assumption-based explanation can be found in 
polynomial time. 
Theorem 7. Given a set of positive Horn clauses 2, a set of assumptions A, and a 
query letter q, an assumption-based explanation for q can be computed in polynomial 
time. 
An algorithm would start by simply trying the set of all letters in the assumption 
set as a potential explanation (i.e., check whether _Z U A implies q). If that set is not 
sufficient to infer q, then there exists no assumption-based explanation for q. Otherwise, 
the algorithm will proceed by minimizing the set by removing letters from it (one at a 
time). A letter is removed if the remaining assumptions combined with the background 
theory still implies q. This can be checked in polynomial time since 2 is Horn. This 
time we do not have to check for consistency (condition (2) in Definition 1 ), because 
we only have definite Horn clauses which are always consistent. So, we can identify at 
least one tractable, albeit weak, form of abductive reasoning. Eshghi [ 1 l] has recently 
identified a somewhat less restricted background theory that also still allows for tractable 
abduction. Kautz et al. [ 191 and Khardon and Roth [21] identify a quite different class 
of tractable abduction problems by introducing a model-based representation. Alterna- 
tively, we can also consider some notion of “approximate” explanation, or perhaps some 
principled form of unsound or incomplete abduction [22]. Incomplete abduction can 
also be obtained by using an incomplete inference mechanism, such as the satisfiability 
procedure proposed by Selman et al. [ 33,341. (There is a quite natural translation of the 
NP-complete Horn abduction task into a propositional satisfiability problem.) Another 
‘) The problem is closely related to the hypergraph enumeration problem, which status remains open [ 101. 
I” These are clauses with exactly one positive literal, also called pure Horn clauses. 
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way of dealing with the intractability of the abduction task would be by translating Horn 
background theories into a tractable form, using ideas along the lines of [ 8,321. Finally, 
there has been a substantial amount of work on the use of various heuristics to improve 
on the worst-case exponential search behaviour of the ATMS. For example, Forbus and 
de Kleer [ 131 propose a mechanism for focusing the ATMS on the part of the search 
space that is directly relevant to the problem under consideration. In [5], de Kleer 
improves efficiency by exploiting certain locality aspects in the underlying background 
theory. For a further discussion on heuristic methods for improving the efficiency of the 
ATMS in practical applications, see [ 6,14,20]. 
4. The computational core 
We have shown that finding an assumption-based explanation is intractable, even when 
the background theory _X is an acyclic set of Horn clauses. In this section, we will isolate 
a subtask, called the Support Selection Task, which lies at the core of the computational 
difficulties. 
Definition 8 (Support Selection Task). Given a set of Horn clauses 2, a set of letters 
A C P, and a letter q, find a set of unit clauses a, called a support set, such that the 
following conditions hold: 
(1) Z‘ua+s, 
(2) 2 U a is consistent, and 
(3) LY contains only letters form A. 
Note that an assumption-based explanation is simply a minimal support set. We first 
consider the complexity of the Support Selection Task: 
Theorem 9. Given a Horn theory 2, a set A C P, and a letter q, jinding a support 
set for q is NP-complete. 
This result follows directly from a generalization of the reduction used in the proof of 
Theorem 5. Since the reduction does not rely on finding a minimal set of assumptions 
to support the query, any support set for the query will identify a path that goes from s 
to t containing at most one vertex from each forbidden pair. 
Because an assumption-based explanation is a minimal support set, finding such 
an explanation is at least as hard as finding support sets. Hence, the intractability of 
finding an assumption-based explanation is in fact a direct consequence of Theorem 9. 
Stated differently, in order to establish the intractability of finding an assumption-based 
explanation, one need not use the fact that explanations are minimal. This is in contrast 
with the widely held belief that it’s the minimality of explanations that makes them 
difficult to compute. 
Furthermore, the minimality requirement does not further increase the computational 
difficulty of the task, as can be seen from the following argument. Consider a support 
set LY for q. We can minimize this set in polynomial time by removing clauses from it 
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while each time verifying that the reduced set combined with 2 still implies q. Since 
_E is a Horn theory this can be done in polynomial time. Finally, note that the Support 
Selection Task can be shown to be no harder than any problem in NP, and thus neither 
is generating an assumption-based explanation. 
To summarize, the Support Selection Task is at the core of the AT&IS-style abduction 
task. In the next section, we will see how this task also is at the core of goal-directed 
default reasoning, thereby establishing a computational connection between abductive 
and default reasoning. 
5. Default reasoning 
Default Logic, introduced by Reiter [28], is one of the more prominent formal 
proposals for representing and reasoning with default information. We will first briefly 
define Default Logic (see [ 12,281 for further details), and subsequently consider the 
complexity of default logic theories. 
Reiter formalized default reasoning by extending first-order logic with default rules. 
A default theory is a pair (D, W) where D is a set of default rules and W a set of 
ordinary first-order formulas. A rule is of the form: 
Y 
where CY is the prerequisite, p the conclusion, and y the justijcation of the rule, each 
of them formulas. A rule is intuitively understood as meaning that if LY is known, and 
p is consistent with what is known, then y may be inferred. 
An extension is a maximal set of conclusions that can be drawn from a theory. But 
care must be taken that none of the justifications of the rules used in the construction of 
an extension conflict with its final contents, and that every formula in the extension can 
in fact be derived from W and the rules. The formal definition of an extension (from 
[ 28, Theorem 2.11) is therefore rather complex: 
Definition 10 (Extension). A set of formulas E is an extension for the theory (D, W) 
if and only if it satisfies the following equations: ” 
E. = w, 
and for i > 0 
a:p 
-ED,aEEi,mdTp#E 
Y 
E=&$. 
i=O 
Note the explicit reference to E in the definition of Ei+l. Th denotes logical closure. 
‘I We assume that all formulas are closed, i.e., they do not contain free variables. 
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5. I. Computing extensions 
Kautz and Selman [ 181 give a detailed analysis of the computational complexity 
default reasoning based on Reiter’s proposal. They consider a partially ordered space 
of 
of 
more and less general propositional default logic theories. For each theory the complex- 
ity is determined of the following tasks: finding an extension (credulous reasoning), 
generating an extension that contains a given set of propositions (goal-directed reason- 
ing), and the problem of determining what holds in all extensions of a default logic 
theory (skeptical reasoning). To avoid the difficulty of the consistency check needed to 
determine whether a rule can be applied, Kautz and Selman restrict the default theories 
to ones in which the set of facts W, the prerequisites, the justifications, and the con- 
sequences each consist of a set of unit clauses. Here we will consider a relaxation of 
these restrictions. In particular, we will allow W to contain Horn clauses. 
We will show that even for extremely simple default rules and a Horn theory W 
goal-directed default reasoning is intractable, and that the computational difficulty is 
again appropriately characterized by the Support Selection Task. ‘* To facilitate our 
discussion, a rule of the form : p/p will be called an eEementary default-these rules 
are the simplest possible defaults. l3 
We have the following result concerning goal-directed default reasoning: 
Theorem 11. Given an acyclic Horn theory W, a set of elementary defaults D, and a 
letter q, @ding an extension of (D, W) that contains q is NP-complete. l4 
This result strengthens a result by Stillman [ 3.51, who showed the task is NP-hard for 
arbitrary Horn theories with general normal unary defaults. But aside from strengthening 
Stillman’s result, our interest in this result arises from the fact that the Support Selection 
Task lies again at the root of the computational difficulty of the problem, as we will see 
below. 
To prove Theorem 11, we first consider the relation between goal-directed default 
reasoning and the Support Selection Task. Note that if 2 is a Horn theory and D a set 
of elementary defaults involving letters from a set A, then each extension of (D, 2) is 
of the form Th( 2 U (Y), where LY is a set of unit clauses drawn from A. Intuitively, CY is 
the set of letters that are added to 2 via the rules in D. We have the following theorem. 
Theorem 12. Let 2 be a Horn theory, q be a lettel; A & P be a set of letters, and let 
D = {: p/p 1 p E A}. Then, Th( 2 U a) is an extension of (D, 2) that contains q if and 
only if a is a maximal support set of q. 
I2 Determining the complexity of goal-directed reasoning for such theories was given as one of the central 
open problems in 1 IS]. 
‘? Using the terminology of Kautz and Selman [ IS], they are normal “nary defaults with empty prerequisites 
and positive consequences. 
I4 Since an extension consists of an infinite set of formulas because of the logical closure, we are only looking 
for a set of unit clauses that represents an extension. 
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The proof of this is somewhat tedious but relatively straightforward. From this theo- 
rem, it follows that finding extensions of the default logic theory that contains a given 
letter q is at least as hard as finding a support set for q. Thus, Theorem 11 follows 
directly from the fact that the Support Selection Task is NP-complete (Theorem 9). 
Furthermore, the fact that extensions correspond to maximal support sets does not add 
further to the difficulty of computing extensions: Given a support set, one can simply try 
adding additional letters from the assumption set while maintaining consistency, until 
a maximal set is obtained. Thus, as for assumption-based explanations, the Support 
Selection Task is the difficult part of goal-directed default reasoning. 
It is suggested in [ 181 that goal-directed reasoning default could be of use in res- 
olution theorem provers that incorporate default information. Our results here suggest 
that such an integration will most likely run into computational difficulties. Much more 
promising, are credulous reasoners that search for an arbitrary extension. This task re- 
mains tractable for relatively expressive default rules combined with Horn theories. By 
contrast, skeptical default reasoning, i.e., determining what holds in all extensions of a 
theory, can be shown to be strictly harder than goal-directed reasoning, and thus our 
intractability result carries over to skeptical reasoning. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the problem of computing abductive explanations. 
We have shown that given a Horn theory and a letter q, some nontrivial explanation for 
q can be calculated in polynomial time. However, goal-directed abduction or the use of 
an assumption set renders the problem intractable, even for acyclic Horn theories. Thus, 
the exponential worst-case complexity of the ATMS is not just a consequence of having 
to return an exponential number of answers; generating even one explanation containing 
letters from the assumption set is inherently difficult. It appears unlikely, therefore, that 
the efficiency of the ATMS algorithm can be significantly improved. 
This work also shows that there is a strong connection between computing explana- 
tions and computing extensions in default logic. Our Support Selection Task is at the 
core of both assumption-based abductive reasoning and goal-directed default reasoning. 
We need to minimize support sets for the former, and maximize them for the latter, 
but neither is hard for Horn theories. In both cases, the difficult task is deciding on an 
appropriate set of assumptions to make. 
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